Schumpeter revisited : faster better cheaper as grounds for entrepreneurial success and a path to an IPO. by Olsavsky, Charles Raymond
University of Louisville
ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
5-2019
Schumpeter revisited : faster better cheaper as




Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.library.louisville.edu/etd
Part of the Entrepreneurial and Small Business Operations Commons
This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ThinkIR: The University of Louisville's Institutional
Repository. This title appears here courtesy of the author, who has retained all other copyrights. For more information, please contact
thinkir@louisville.edu.
Recommended Citation
Olsavsky, Charles Raymond, "Schumpeter revisited : faster better cheaper as grounds for entrepreneurial success and a path to an IPO."







FASTER BETTER CHEAPER AS GROUNDS 
FOR ENTREPRENEURIAL SUCCESS  





Charles Raymond Olsavsky 
 
B.E., Youngstown State University, 1979 
J.D., University of Akron, 1987 




Submitted to the Faculty of the 
College of Business of the University of Louisville 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 
for the Degree of 




College of Business 










Copyright 2019 by Charles Raymond Olsavsky 











SCHUMPETER REVISITED: FASTER BETTER CHEAPER 
AS GROUNDS FOR 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SUCCESS AND A PATH TO AN IPO 
 
By 
Charles Raymond Olsavsky 
B.E., Youngstown State University, 1979 
J.D., University of Akron, 1987 
M.B.A., University of Michigan (Ann Arbor), 2012 
 
A Dissertation Approved on 
 
April 15th, 2019 
by the following Dissertation Committee: 
 
 
Dr. James O. Fiet 
 
 
Dr. Robert P. Garrett 
 
 
Dr. Andrew Manikas 
 
 








This dissertation is dedicated to my family including 
my wife Linda Olsavsky 













I would like to thank my wife Linda Olsavsky for all of her patience, hard work and 
support.  Due to my handicaps and her IT skills, she provided help and support that was 
much greater than the usual support of a spouse. 
I would like to thank my dissertation chair, Dr. Fiet for his hard work, patience and 
valuable guidance through the dissertation process.  I would also like to thank my other 
committee members for assistance and comments: Dr. Garrett, especially for his comments 
on producing publishable articles; Dr. Manikas, especially for his guidance on Dr. Hammer 
research; and Dr. Juan, especially for his guidance on research methodology. 
I would also like to thank Dr. Kenney and Dr. Martin (both at UC Davis) for giving 
me access to their database Firm Database of Emerging Growth Initial Public Offerings 








SCHUMPETER REVISITED: FASTER BETTER CHEAPER 
AS GROUNDS FOR 
ENTREPRENEURIAL SUCCESS AND A PATH TO AN IPO 
 
By 
Charles Raymond Olsavsky 
 
April 15, 2019 
 
Current entrepreneurship research focuses on two types of entrepreneurial firms: 
(1) the firms that develop innovative novel products or services arising from technological 
innovation; and (2) the firms that develop innovative novel products or services arising 
from recognition of an opportunity in existing conditions, no type of change required.  A 
third type of business founder has been largely ignored in the modern entrepreneurship 
research - - the founder who enters a competitive market with no novel product or service 
that he or she invented.  I refer to this founder in a competitive market as a performance 
entrepreneur.  This dissertation presents theory to argue that there are high growth 
opportunities in certain competitive markets and analyzes the prevalence of performance 
entrepreneurs among US IPO firms.  Of particular interest is the performance entrepreneur 
who enters a new competitive market recently enabled by new technology. 
I present theoretical arguments (under a resource based view(RBV)) that the 
majority of high growth firms are performance entrepreneurship firms, not firms with 
innovative new products.  Joseph Schumpeter opined in 1942 that technological advances 
were becoming too complex for entrepreneurial firms.  Michael Hammer opined through 
vi 
 
the 1990s and early 2000’s that many business opportunities would arise through efficiency 
as a result of technological changes.  I utilize these opinions and theories to advance my 
theory. 
In a stratified research effort, I reviewed SEC filings of over 500 firms that went 
through IPOs in the 1995-2015 period.  IPO firms are firms very successful firms that have 
achieved high growth and are generally considered to be at the pinnacle of 
entrepreneurship.  My interest is the business ventures pursued by successful firms. 
The research showed that over 80% of these firms were performance 
entrepreneurship firms, not firms that had developed high technology products or services.  
This research is important because it shines a light on an important group of entrepreneurs 
who have been largely ignored in the modern entrepreneurship, even though they figured 
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Current Theory That We Know 
There is an emphasis in the modern entrepreneurship research on business founders 
who have a novel product or service. In the last 15 years, a debate of  entrepreneurship 
researchers has been whether entrepreneurs “discover” opportunities to start businesses or 
whether entrepreneurs “create” opportunities to start businesses (Alvarez et al., 2013; 
Alvarez & Barney, 2007). The discover or create debate centers on business founders with 
novel products or services.  
Concerning the creation process, Alvarez and Barney (2007, p. 15) describe 
entrepreneurial opportunities as “created, endogenously, by the actions, reactions, and 
enactments of entrepreneurs exploring ways to produce new products or services (Baker 
and Nelson, 2005; Gartner, 1985; Sarasvathy, 2001; Weick, 1979).”   
 Turning to discovery, the discovery process generally involves entrepreneurs who 
are able to see new opportunities in the markets that nonentrepreneurs cannot see (Alvarez 
& Barney, 2007; Kirzner, 1973).  Kirzner refers to the skill to see new opportunities as 
“alertness” (Kirzner, 1973, p. 6).  The concept of alertness really does not apply to a 
business founder entering a competitive market that many see the opportunity for, 
especially if her or his plan is simply to perform better than the competition.  Thus, (1) the 
creation view expressly requires a novel product or service and (2) the discovery view 




In an article published in a leading management journal for theoretical research, the 
Academy of Management Review (AMR), Ramoglou and Tsang (2016) propose that the 
discover/create debate can be solved by referring to entrepreneurial efforts as actualization 
rather than discovery or creation. In doing so, they clarify the requirement of a new product 
or service in order for activity to be entrepreneurial.  Ramoglou and Tsang (2016, p. 411) 
define entrepreneurial opportunity as “the propensity of market demand to be actualized 
into profits through the introduction of novel products or services.” Thus, once again a 
novel product or service is required in a modern definition concerning entrepreneurship.   
Ramoglou and Tsang (2016) note that “entrepreneurship” can include introducing 
a product that is novel to one market, but not novel globally. However, they point out that 
their definition of entrepreneurship does not include typical innovative efforts in a 
competitive environment such as innovative cost-cutting. They state that under their 
definition of entrepreneurship, all innovation is not entrepreneurial, only innovation that 
produces novel products or services. 
Various leading scholars have responded to the Ramoglou and Tsang (2016) article 
in the Dialogue section of AMR.  Further, Davidsson (2017) responded with an article in 
Journal of Business Venturing Insights. All of the critique of the Ramoglou and Tsang 
(2016) article concerns philosophical points, not an objection to the requirement for novel 
products or services. Consequently, much of the entrepreneurship research community 
apparently concurs with the concept that entrepreneurship requires a novel products or 
service.   
Looking at entrepreneurship through another lense, often entrepreneurship 
researchers put entrepreneurship into two categories: (1) Schumpeterian; and (2) 
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Kirznerian (Foss & Klein, 2010; Shane, 2003).  The term Schumpeterian entrepreneurship 
is named after the economist Joseph Schumpeter and refers to entrepreneurship that arises 
out of some type of change, usually technological but possibly political, economic, or 
social change (Schumpeter, 1934; Shane, 2003).  A classic example of Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurship is an entrepreneurial pharmaceutical firm inventing and commercializing 
a new breakthrough drug.   
The term Kirznerian entrepreneurship is named after the Austrian economist Israel 
Kirzner and refers to entrepreneurship concerning alertness to arbitrage type opportunities- 
- no technological or societal change required (Shane, 2003).  Under the Kirznerian 
definition, entrepreneurship is the act of discovering, or being alert to, opportunities that 
others fail to realize. It often contains an element of surprise (Kirzner, 1997).  The 
discovery entails discovering an opportunity that was right under the nose of everybody, 
but everybody failed to recognize before now (Kirzner, 1997).  A classic example of 
Kirznerian entrepreneurship is an entrepreneur inventing a simple new product that leaves 
many kicking themselves, saying “why didn’t I think of that”.   
The Kirznerian notion of entrepreneurship as defined by modern scholars does not 
absolutely have a strict requirement of a novel product or service like the modern concepts 
of creation and actualization, but it certainly includes and anticipates ventures with creative 
new products (cf. Foss & Klein, 2010; Shane, 2003).  Similarly, while Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurship as defined by modern scholars arguably could include a venture with a 
launch other than a launch with a technologically innovative new product,  the innovative 
new product launch is certainly a focus of the modern Schumpeterian  entrepreneurship 
definition (cf. Foss & Klein, 2010; Shane, 2003).   
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Arguably, the emphasis on novel products and services in the literature is  
justifiable by  theory.  Alvarez and Barney (2007, p.14) cite Barney (1986) in opining 
theory that “In a setting where everyone could potentially become aware of and exploit an 
opportunity, it would be difficult for anyone to generate sufficient profits from actually 
producing new products or services.”  In other words, it is difficult to make money in a 
competitive market.  This difficulty in a competitive market arguably makes founders of 
businesses in competitive markets less interesting than founders with novel products or 
services. 
Research Results That We Know 
With the emphasis on firms launched with novel products and services, a critical 
event of entrepreneurship is discovering a novel product or service.  Also, a  critical point 
in time is when the discovery is made.  In the modern entrepreneurship literature,  
entrepreneurship has been defined as the discovery, evaluation and exploitation of 
opportunities to introduce future goods and services  (Venkataraman, 1997).  This 
definition highlights the importance of the discovery of a novel product or service because 
exploitation (benefitting from) follows their discovery.   
Following this logic,  there has been extensive research concerning the 
characteristics of the persons who launch these firms with novel products or services.  
There has been over two decades of research concerning the differences between these 
entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs (Alvarez &Barney, 2007; Busenitz & Barney, 1997).   
What We Do Not Know 
In the modern entrepreneurship literature, regardless of whether one is talking about 
discovering, creating, actualizing, Schumpeterian or Kirznerian, there are two basic themes 
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to the literature: (1) a new product or service and (2) avoiding competition.  Kirznerian 
entrepreneurs avoid competition via arbitrage conditions.  The usual Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs avoid competition via technological innovation.  The competition avoidance 
meshes well with the theory of both (1) Alvarez & Barney (2007) and (2) Barney (1986) 
that it is hard to make money on a venture when many can see the venture opportunity.   
Certainly, it is advisable to avoid competition when possible.  However, it is not 
always possible to avoid competition.  I argue that it is difficult, if not nearly impossible to 
do so in most situations.  Usually, it is necessary to face competition if you want to start a 
firm.  There has not been extensive research in the modern entrepreneurship literature 
concerning business founders who enter competitive markets with no novel product or 
service. 
Theory says that entrepreneurial opportunities arise from change such as 
technological, political, cultural, legal and social change (Schumpeter, 1934).  Yet, there 
has not been extensive research concerning business founders utilizing recently developed 
technology to develop ventures dependent on the new technology in a competitive 
environment. 
It is common knowledge that most business startups fail.  Although there has been 
extensive research into the distinctions between entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs, there 
has not been research into the distinctions between successful entrepreneurs and failed 
entrepreneurs. 
 Important issues in resource-based (RBV) theory are how entrepreneurs source 
heterogeneous and hard to copy resources and capabilities to develop sustained competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991).  There has not been extensive research into the sourcing of  
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heterogeneous resources needed by business founders in competitive markets to attain 
sustainable competitive advantage (cf. Barney, 1991). 
 Entrepreneurship literature focuses on innovation to develop new products to avoid 
competition.  However, there are other types of innovation.  Byers, Dorf and Nelson (2010) 
define radical innovation or disruptive innovation as creating new products or services - - 
what the entrepreneurship research has covered.  They define incremental innovation as 
characterized by faster better or cheaper versions of existing products or services, either an 
improved version of the product or service, better delivery of the same product or service, 
or offering the same product or service at a better price.  The business founder in a 
competitive environment performs incremental innovation and this type of innovation has 
not been covered extensively in the entrepreneurship literature.   
Research Question 
I define one term to set up my research question.  The startup firm entering a 
competitive market competing on incremental innovation does not fit well into either the 
Schumpeterian or Kirznerian category. I argue it is really a third type of entrepreneurial 
firm.  This firm really does not create, discover or actualize anything because it does not 
have the “novel” product or service contemplated in the literature.  It does not benefit from 
being alert to opportunities that others did not see, and it does not have a technologically 
innovative new product.   
I realize that this type of business founder is outside the scope of some researchers’ 
definition of entrepreneurship.  Arguably, depending how broadly Schumpeterian and 
Kirznerian entrepreneurship is defined, this firm could fit under one of those definitions.  
However,  under the recent AMJ Ramoglou and Tsang view, the firm falls completely 
outside the definition of entrepreneurship. 
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  I refer to this type of  a business founder as a performance entrepreneur.  The 
performance entrepreneur really does not discover an opportunity or anything at all because 
he or she is either: (A) pursuing the same opportunity that (1) the incumbent competition 
is already pursuing while operating in plain sight and/or (2) other entrepreneurs are 
planning to pursue; or (B) attempting to sell a product or service invented by a third party.  
Further, the performance entrepreneur really does not exploit any opportunity, but rather 
he or she (1) competes for market space in a competitive environment or (2) attempts to 
market a new product or service developed by a third party.   
In this dissertation, I investigate how prevalent performance entrepreneurship firms 
are in the ranks of US IPO firms that (1) have not created or developed new products, but 
(2) do have a business model that depends on technology recently developed by others.  An 
example of this could be an entrepreneurial retail firm formed to compete in a soon to be 
crowded market selling and installing new technologically innovative products developed 
and manufactured by a third party.  Specifically, my main research question is:  
In the ranks of US IPO firms, how prevalent are performance 
entrepreneurship firms that have a business model that depends on new 
technology recently developed by others?   
Recent entrepreneurship research has focused on innovative new products and 
services as the key to entrepreneurial success.  The business founder who enters a 
competitive market is viewed as less attractive, almost certainly not a good enough 
candidate to achieve the pinnacle.  I question and investigate that thinking.  While classic 
economics says that competitive markets do not have high profit potential, I investigate 
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how often performance entrepreneurs break through barriers and achieve extraordinary 
profits in competitive environments. 
Few would doubt that there are numerous performance entrepreneurship 
opportunities that are not high growth opportunities such as local house painting, bakeries, 
handyman services, car washes and lawn services.   This is obvious and beyond dispute.  
By looking at IPO firms, I investigate (1) whether it is really necessary to have an 
innovative novel offering to reach the pinnacle of entrepreneurship, an IPO (Shane, 2003), 
or (2) whether performance entrepreneurs often reach this pinnacle.   
Traditional Research 
While the performance entrepreneur may have been neglected in modern research, 
the performance entrepreneur is present in the traditional research.  This emphasis in the 
modern literature for a novel product or service is a departure from early entrepreneurship 
research, including Schumpeter’s thinking.  Schumpeter had a broad definition of 
entrepreneurship that did not require a novel product or service.  His definition of 
entrepreneurship included not only introducing new products, but also new production 
methods, new sources of supply and new industrial combinations (Schumpeter, 1934, 
1939, 1942).  Thus, while new innovative production methods to reduce costs is not 
entrepreneurial under Ramoglou and Tsang’s definition, they are under Schumpeter’s 
definition of entrepreneurship.  Apparently, modern researchers have narrowed the scope 
of entrepreneurship. 
The modern narrowing of the study of entrepreneurship is not only inconsistent 
with Schumpeter, but other early entrepreneurship scholars as well.  For instance, 
Cantillion (1755) viewed the entrepreneur as a person motivated by profit to engage in 
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arbitrage by buying at a certain price and selling at an uncertain price.  Later, Menger 
(1871) viewed the entrepreneur as a capitalist and manager who: (1) assesses the economic 
landscape; (2) makes economic calculations and predictions about potential business 
activity; (3) willfully sets planned business activity into motion; and (4) supervises the 
business activity.  
Mises (1949) viewed the entrepreneur as a speculator attempting to make a profit 
off his/her opinions about future economic circumstances.  None of these scholars require 
entrepreneurship to involve a novel product or service.   Even more recently, Shane (2003) 
had a definition of entrepreneurship that did not require a new product or service offering 
by the entrepreneurial firm.   
Research Question Importance 
This is an important issue.  In order for the field of entrepreneurship to advance, 
empirical research concerning entrepreneur activity in discovering/selecting ventures is 
needed (Shane, 2016).  This study is such research.  Moreover, the prevalence of the 
performance entrepreneur may shine a light on an important entrepreneur who has been 
ignored in the modern entrepreneurship research. 
Performance entrepreneurship may be more profitable than theorized.  Performance 
entrepreneurs may be more prevalent among the ranks of highly successful entrepreneurs 
than expected.  The performance entrepreneur, although neglected in most modern 
research, is part of the entrepreneurship family in the traditional literature. These are 
important areas of research that are currently not researched.   
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The field of entrepreneurship cannot advance until an understanding is developed 
of what entrepreneurs actually do (Aldrich & Ruef, 2019).  This dissertation performs 
important work towards that mission. 
Examples of Performance Entrepreneurship 
 
I want to point out some examples of highly successful performance entrepreneurs 
to help motivate interest in the study of performance entrepreneurs.   These entrepreneurs 
did not have innovative novel products or services when they started, but instead mostly 
(1) competed on price or (2) competed with an arguably better version of an existing 
product already on the market.   
Sam Walton built his Walmart empire without any innovative, clever new products 
dreamed up in a Kirznerian moment of brilliance.  He sold his products through the same 
basic channels (brick and mortar stores) as the competition and sold the exact same 
toothpaste, laundry detergent and paper towels as the competition.  The Amazon history is 
similar, it started out selling the exact same music, books and videos as the competition in 
a new method (e commerce) that was being attempted by many. 
Apple did not invent the PC.  Instead, it came out with an improved version of the 
PC which sold well.  There were multiple PCs on the market before Apple appeared.  
Microsoft’s early history is similar - - not innovative new and different products, but better 
versions of existing products. 
Google did not invent the search engine.  Twelve other firms had search engines up 
and running before Google.  VC firms passed on investing in Google because Google was 
a late comer entering an already crowded market with more competition yet entering.  
Google succeeded because it had a better version of an already existing service.    
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Facebook’s history parallels Google’s.  Facebook did not invent social media.  When 
Facebook started, My Space had a dominant market share which Facebook had to 
overcome.  Certainly, these are cherry picked examples of firms.  This dissertation will 






LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Definitions 
To streamline the rest of the dissertation, I introduce three more definitions.  I 
assign two classifications to every firm: (1) a classification based on its own activity; and 
(2) a classification based on the technological environment in which it operates.  I define 
three terms to describe the activity of entrepreneurial firms:  
(1) tech-maker entrepreneurship;  
(2) Kirznerian entrepreneurship; and  
(3) performance entrepreneurship.   
Every firm in the sample will have one or more of these three classifications.   
Tech-maker entrepreneurship is entrepreneurship by a firm involving a new 
product or service offering based on technological innovation accomplished by the firm 
itself.   A firm designing, developing, manufacturing and selling a new high-tech widget is 
an example of tech-maker entrepreneurship.  Kirznerian entrepreneurship is 
entrepreneurship involving a new product offering that was possible without new 




Performance entrepreneurship concerns entrepreneurship involving a firm (1) 
selling the same basic product or service as the competition or (2) selling a new product or 
service developed by a third party.  It is not necessary that the performance 
entrepreneurship firm achieves any level of performance excellence, only that the firm 
strives for market share while competing on (1) price, (2) quality, (3) service or (4) product 
differentiation (better features of an existing product that are obviously desirable).   
Separate and distinct from this classification based on firm activity, I provide a 
second classification of firms based on their technological environment.  I have two 
classifications for the technological environment of firms.  The term tech-enabled 
entrepreneurship means efforts of a firm that require recent technological innovations 
developed by others, not the firm itself.   A firm selling and installing or servicing a new 
high-tech widget recently developed by a different firm is an example of tech-enabled 
entrepreneurship. Recent means widely available for the benefit of the firm or its customers 
no more than eight years before firm founding.  Eight years is a number I selected based 
on the amount of time it could take a firm to recognize an opportunity and procure 
necessary resources for a firm.  The alternative calculation the tech-enabled 
entrepreneurship is simply not tech-enabled. 
In Chapter III, I will place boundaries around these terms so that they can be 
measures in my hypotheses testing.  Figure 1 depicts the different classifications. 
______________________ 




Figure 1 depicts (1) the three classifications that a firm can have for its own conduct, 
(2) the two classifications that a firm can have based on its environment, and (3) the 
possible interactions of these classifications.  The three circles represent the three types of 
ventures based on firm activity: tech-maker, Kirznerian and performance entrepreneurship.  
Under any of these classifications, a firm is also classified as either (a) tech-enabled or (b) 
not tech-enabled.  I use the vertical line to segregate (a) tech-enabled and (b) not tech-
enabled ventures, with each circle having the two separate regions (half circles) designated 
with capital letters.      
Firms in the spaces to the right of the vertical line are tech-enabled firms (in spaces 
B, D or F); and firms to the left of the line are not tech-enabled firms (in spaces A, C or E).  
Performance entrepreneurship firms do not overlap Kirznerian and tech-maker 
entrepreneurship firms because they do not have new products or customer delivery 
methods that they developed themselves, and the other firms do.  The horizontal line in 
Figure 1 is a border between firms that do and firms that do not have a new product or 
customer delivery method that they developed themselves.  The firms that are the main 
subject of the research question are in space F.  In space F, the firms have not developed 
any new product offering, but their business model depends on recent technological 
developments of others. 
Resource-Based View 
The theory developed herein is grounded in the resource-based view (RBV) of 
strategy.  A focus of resource-based view strategy is competitive advantage which is 
defined as the accumulation of idiosyncratic, costly (or impossible) to copy resources 
controlled by a firm that give a firm competitive advantage (Barney, 1997).   
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When possible, a firm should strive to achieve and maintain sustainable competitive 
advantage which is defined as a value-creating strategy that a firm is implementing (1) that 
is not being simultaneously implemented by the competition and (2) wherein the 
competition and potential competition are not able to duplicate the benefits arising out of 
the strategy (Barney, 1991). 
A firm goal under  RBV is to acquire a collection of resources that are worth more 
collectively than the cost of acquiring the individual resources (Barney, 1986).  The 
development of operations and marketing know-how in a new market can be a critical part 
of this effort 
While the term resources includes tangible goods and cash, it also includes 
knowledge, information, know-how, skills, goodwill and other intellectual property.  
Acquiring sustainable competitive advantage usually involves a combination of multiple 
types of resources. 
Performance Entrepreneurship Prevalence 
Firms in a performance entrepreneurship venture generally compete on product 
quality, marketing and/or price.  Business opportunity can arise from operating efficiency 
of operations (Hammer and Champy, 1993; Hammer & Stanton, 1995; Hammer, 1996; 
Hammer, 2001; Hammer, 2004; Hammer & Hershman, 2010;).  Under RBV, firms can 
create value by accumulating the resources to function efficiently.  Michael Hammer 
(2004, p. 84) describes an example of a firm achieving success without an innovative new 
product: 
In 1991, Progressive Insurance, an automobile insurer based in Mayfield 
Village, Ohio, had approximately $1.3 billion in sales. By 2002, that figure 
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had grown to $9.5 billion. What fashionable strategies did Progressive 
employ to achieve sevenfold growth in just over a decade? Was it positioned 
in a high-growth industry? Hardly. Auto insurance is a mature, 100-year-
old industry. . . Did it diversify into new businesses? No, Progressive’s 
business was . . . consumer auto insurance. Did it go global? Again, no...  
Neither did it grow through acquisitions or clever marketing schemes. For 
years, Progressive did little advertising, and some of its campaigns were 
notably unsuccessful. It didn’t unveil a slew of new products. Nor did it 
grow at the expense of its margins, even when it set low prices. . . The 
company’s growth has not only been dramatic—it is now the country’s third 
largest auto insurer—it has also been profitable. 
. . .  By offering lower prices and better service than its rivals, it simply took 
their customers away. And what enabled Progressive to have better prices 
and service was operational innovation, the invention and deployment of 
new ways of doing work. 
Hammer defines the term operational innovation which is narrower than the term 
performance entrepreneurship.  However, operational innovation is a possible component 
of performance entrepreneurship, probably a dominant component of performance 
entrepreneurship.  Going back further in time, Progressive is an example of performance 
entrepreneurship because the whole business plan of Progressive from the start was to sell 
the exact same automobile insurance as the competition to certain high-risk drivers, but at 
a better price than the competition.   
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 A term commonly used to describe competing on operational innovation is faster 
better cheaper. The three terms have been used in a variety of orders such as faster cheaper 
better (Hammer & Hershman, 2010).  .  Hammer (2004) predicted that the pursuit of faster 
better cheaper would be the driving force of the modern economy.  Hammer (2004) opined 
that a central force in business innovation will be the quest for operational innovation.  In 
other words, competition to be faster, better and/or cheaper than the competition, not 
necessarily competition to come up with a clever new product.   
 A fact of US life in modern times that drives this desire for faster better cheaper is 
global competition.  Particularly competition from countries with low cost labor, driving 
down pricing of goods.  Moreover, the global competition adds actors competing for 
customers, thereby intensifying price competition. 
 Another factor that drives down the cost of goods and services and thereby creates 
a resulting need for faster better cheaper is the knowledge of consumers (Hammer, 1997).  
The modern consumer today can easily compare pricing and features of goods and services 
on the internet in ways that were not possible 30 years ago.  Under these circumstances, 
there is intensified price competition creating a need to be price competitive, and in turn 
creating a need for faster better cheaper.  Commercial purchasers now enjoy the same 
technology. 
 Yet another factor is increased competition via the internet.  Before the internet, 
usually if a consumer wanted to buy an item, the consumer usually bought it from a local 
merchant, and the local merchants competed with each other.  Now in the age of the 
internet, often the consumer can buy the item from a local merchant, or a variety of e 
commerce vendors.  The e commerce vendors come from around the globe.  The local 
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merchant now has to be competitive with the new actors, thereby tightening price 
competition and in turn creating a need for faster better cheaper.  
Hammer (2004) considered operational efficiency as a source of opportunity in the 
modern economy for two more reasons: (1) corporate management weak spots; and (2) 
rapid technological innovation.  Hammer (2004) considered operations as a possible 
weakness in large established firms because their leadership is often dominated by 
marketing and finance people, not operations people.  This weakness arguably enables 
opportunities for performance entrepreneurs to compete against firms with operations 
challenged management by employing faster better cheaper efforts.   
Entering an established market is difficult.  However, if the management of the 
incumbent firms in an industry are not operating efficiently, there can be entrepreneurial 
opportunities for a new firm operating efficiently.  Under Hammer’s view, these 
opportunities may exist frequently because of management steeped in marketing and 
finance skills, but not operations skills. 
Further, Hammer (2004) envisioned rapid technological innovation enabling 
operational efficiency and thereby enabling business opportunities based on the newly 
available technology enabled efficiencies.  Changed circumstances resulting from 
technological advances often mean that what was the most efficient way to do things 
yesterday is no longer the most efficient way today because tasks can be done more 
efficiently today with the new technology.  Rapidly changing technology means rapidly 
developing opportunities for performance entrepreneurs. 
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All these opportunities enabled by corporate weak spots, rapidly changing 
technology and the market conditions described above are opportunities for the 
performance entrepreneur.  The quest for faster better cheaper creates entrepreneurial 
opportunity at two levels.   First, there is opportunity for an entrepreneurial firm to excel 
by making its own operations efficient.  Second, there is opportunity for an entrepreneurial 
to launch ventures improving the efficiency of their clients.  These are opportunities ripe 
for performance entrepreneurs. 
Although seldom mentioned in the recent entrepreneurship literature, a recognized 
basis for entrepreneurial opportunity is decreasing costs of production (Fiet 2002).  
Holcombe (2003) places factors that generate entrepreneurial opportunities in three 
categories: (1) factors that disequilibrate the market; (2) factors that enhance production 
possibilities; and (3) entrepreneurial activity that creates other entrepreneurial opportunity. 
 Holcombe’s second category - - factors that enhance production - - is not limited to 
manufacturing.  He gives a financial services example to illustrate the point.  Before 
modern low cost, long distance transmission of voice and other data, it was not practical to 
have low cost, national brokerage chains.  With the advent of low-cost data transmission, 
low cost national financial service firms developed.   
Hammer’s views are consistent with: (1) Holcombe’s second source of 
entrepreneurial opportunities: factors that enhance production possibilities; and (2) Fiet’s 
view that lowering costs is a source of entrepreneurial opportunity.  Hammer’s operational 
innovation is a factor that enhances production capabilities - - one of Holcombe’s factors.  
Hammer’s view that innovation will drive operational efficiency is also consistent with 
Fiet’s view that lowered costs is a source of opportunity. 
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An analysis of the prevalence of performance entrepreneurship (“PE”) firms among 
IPO firms requires a brief discussion of tech-maker (“TM”) and Kirznerian (“KN”) firms.  
The prevalence of PE firms among IPO firms equals PE/(PE+TM+KN).  Consequently, 
the prevalence performance entrepreneurship firms requires at least some analysis of the 
number of tech-maker and Kirznerian firms.  They are part of the equation.  Below is a 
brief discussion of why the number of Kirznerian and tech-maker firms may not be 
increasing. 
In order to make it to the IPO stage, generally a firm has to attain significant success 
and lasting sustainable advantage.  I submit that Kirznerian ventures will seldom reach the 
IPO stage because the arbitrage opportunities that Kirznerian ventures rely upon often are 
short lived and therefore do not generate the possibility of a sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
Arguably, tech-maker firms making the IPO ranks should be outnumbered by 
performance entrepreneurs making the IPO ranks.  A single technology breakthrough can 
generate multiple entrepreneurial opportunities (cf. Schumpeter, 1934).  This multiplier 
effect suggests that tech-maker firms should be outnumbered by performance firms.  
Moreover, some theory says that technological innovation is becoming the domain of large 
established corporations, not entrepreneurial firms (Acs & Audretsch, 2003; Schumpeter, 
1942; Galbraith, 1956).  This shift could further reduce the number of tech-maker firms.   
Additionally, funding is becoming more of an issue for tech-maker firms.  
Entrepreneurs must obtain financing to realize their opportunities (Baeyens and Manigart, 
2003).  The dominant funder of high growth tech-maker firms - - VC firms - -  are starting 
to shy away from tech-maker firms (Ewens et al., 2014; Kerr &Nanda, 2014, Kerr et al., 
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2014).  CVC is partially filling the void from reduced VC funding for tech-maker firms, 
but it does so with takeover motives cutting off IPO attainment for some acquired firms 
(Basu et al., 2011; Benson and Ziedonis, 2010; Chesbrough, 2002, Dimitrova, 2015; 
Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2006, Dushnitsky, 2012; Dyer, Kale and Singh, 2004; Hellmann, 
2002, 2005; Ivanov& Xie, 2010; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2004; Masulis and Nahata, 2011; 
Rohm, 2018; Wieland, 2005).  The reduced funding arguably reduces the number of tech-
maker firms achieving an IPO.   
Considering: (1) Hammer’s view and other circumstances arguably driving up the 
number of performance entrepreneurship firms; as well as (2) possible downward pressure 
on the number of tech-maker firms resulting from decreased funding and increasing 
complexity; and (3) arguably lackluster potential opportunity for the Kirznerian firm to 
reach the IPO stages, I propose this hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Most firms that make it to the US IPO stage are firms pursuing 
performance entrepreneurship ventures, not Kirznerian or tech-maker ventures. 
I submit that the performance entrepreneur is the dominant form of highly successful 
entrepreneurs. 
Tech-enabled/Performance Entrepreneurship Prevalence & Potential Success 
 Next, I narrow my focus from all performance entrepreneurs to a limited subset of 
performance entrepreneurs.  I look at the performance entrepreneurs who operate in a tech-
enabled environment - - the subjects of the research question.  Under the definitions of this 
dissertation, they are tech-enabled performance entrepreneurs. 
 The high growth of firms reaching the IPO stage enable extraordinary returns for 
early investors. Under the resource-based view (RBV), extraordinary returns generally are 
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not possible unless there is considerable uncertainty regarding the value of the inputs (Amit 
& Shoemaker, 1993. Barney, 1986, 1988).  High risk in early investment in firms that 
achieve high-growth enables extraordinary returns. 
The tech-enabled environment contains considerable uncertainty about the value of 
the inputs.  A tech-enabled venture can be selling or using a new technology.  Regardless 
of whether the tech-enabled opportunity is to (1) utilize a new product or service enabled 
by recent technological innovation or (2) sell a new product or service enabled by recent 
technological innovation, there is considerable uncertainty. There is not only the 
uncertainty about market acceptance of the new product or service, but also uncertainty 
about the reliability of the new product or service.   
There is risk that the new technology that worked fine in the laboratory before going 
to market does not work fine when put to use in the real world.  Further, there is uncertainty 
about the practicalities of everything involved with the product or service.  Also, there is 
uncertainty about the ability of the entrepreneur to perform as necessary with the new 
technology. 
In the tech-enabled/performance entrepreneurship setting, often the entrepreneurial 
opportunity is obvious to those skilled in the subject discipline. Consequently, many firms 
enter the market space in swarms and then there is competition between the firms on either 
cost/price and/or product differentiation (cf. Schumpeter, 1939). In this type of competitive 
environment, the firms that prevail in this competition are the firms that can establish a 
sustainable competitive advantage in cost and/or product differentiation (Porter, 1985). 
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A key component of a developing sustainable competitive advantage is learning 
(Porter, 1985). The firms that generally learn the fastest and learn the most information 
develop a competitive advantage (cf. Porter, 1985; Holcombe, 2013).  The acquired 
information and knowledge cannot generate extraordinary returns for investors unless it is 
knowledge and information that the firm has but not its competitors (Barney, 1986, 1988). 
This concept explains the high-growth opportunities that exist in tech-enabled ventures. If 
a firm wants to enter a mature market with established actors, the firm is usually behind 
the established actors in terms of information and knowledge about the specific market. 
The new entrant faces a major challenge trying to get ahead of the establish actors in terms 
of knowledge and information about the specific industry. 
Conversely, in the tech-enabled scenario, there are no established actors 
participating in the market space.  Consequently, a firm that can learn faster than the other 
novices it is competing against can develop a sustainable competitive advantage. Due to 
the lack of established actors with established customers, a firm in the tech-enabled space 
can achieve high-growth and resulting extraordinary returns for its investors if it learns the 
nuances of the market faster than the competition.  . Thus, in a tech-enabled market a firm 
can achieve high-growth and reach the IPO pinnacle even though it does not have in 
innovative new product or service that it developed. This is true even if the firm is in a 
competitive environment.  Competing in a new market without established actors is 
considered a blue ocean strategy as opposed to a more difficult red ocean strategy with 
blood in the water from fights with established actors (Kim & Maubourgne, 2005).  Kim’s 




All this theory concerning the opportunity for tech-enabled/performance 
entrepreneurship firms, and faster better cheaper leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2: The prevalence of US IPO firms pursuing ventures that are both 
performance ventures and tech-enabled ventures is growing. 
Hypothesis 3: A substantial percentage of US IPO firms are firms pursuing 
ventures that are both performance ventures and tech-enabled ventures.  
Simply, markets recently enabled by technology will produce opportunity for rapid growth. 
Theory Summary 
The entrepreneurship literature has tended to focus on the idea of an innovative 
entrepreneur developing a novel product or service to create wealth.  However, the 
entrepreneur who does not have any innovative new product or technology that he/she 
developed, but utilizes new technology developed by others, may be more common and 
profitable than realized.  A key entrepreneurial skill may be to execute/perform/operate 
better than the competition in competitive markets recently enabled by technological 
innovations of others.  The better performance may be grounded in operational excellence, 
better customer service, better pricing or other factors.  In this setting, entrepreneurial talent 
is needed to adapt to and utilize the finer points of the new technology. 
Stratified Research 
I acknowledge that IPO firms are not a representative or generalizable sample of 
entrepreneurs.  However, IPO firms are some of the most successful entrepreneurial firms, 
if not the most successful.  Entrepreneurship scholars consider attaining an IPO as the 
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pinnacle of entrepreneurship (Shane, 2003).  My interest is not in the entire population of 
entrepreneurs, but rather in the highly successful entrepreneurs.  Various estimates are that 
about 70 or 80% of business startups fail.  Many firms that survive are making low profit 
levels or no real profit at all.  My research does not concern entrepreneurial firms that failed 
or marginally profitable firms.  I want to look at the nature of ventures pursued by 
successful entrepreneurs. 
 Analyzing IPO firms is an excellent way to test my views concerning the dominant 
type of highly successful entrepreneurship.  The pinnacle goal of a VC firm is (1) to invest 
in an entrepreneurial firm by providing both capital and management advice and then (2) 
cashing out with a large payout in an IPO or otherwise (Leach & Melicher, 2015, 2018).  
VC investment strategy suggests that the typical entrepreneurial firm to invest in by a VC 
fund is an entrepreneurial firm on the cutting edge of technology attempting some 
breakthrough - - a firm attempting to proceed in a tech-maker venture.  Therefore, by 
looking at IPO firms, I am looking at the very group of firms that is assumed to be (A) 








Database for Sample of Firms 
The first step of my research was selecting a random sample of IPO firms. To assure 
that I had a database of a rather complete list of firms to randomly select from for my 
sample, I selected firms from a database of US IPO firms provided to me by Martin Kenney 
and Donald Patton dated 2017 and titled: Firm Database of Emerging Growth Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs) from 1990 through 2015.   
After I randomly selected firms from the database for my sample, I had to go 
elsewhere to obtain necessary detailed information about the firms in my sample 
concerning firm activity and firm environment.  The main source for detailed specific 
information concerning firm activity and firm environment was SEC filings (primarily S-
1 forms) of firms that went through a US IPO during the 1995-2015.  I will discuss the 
Kenney and Martin database before moving on to a discussion of the S-1 forms. 
The thoroughness and completeness of this list of firms in Kenney and Martin’s 
Firm Database of Emerging Growth Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) from 1990 through 
2015 is explained by the authors.  Table 2 is a series of excerpts from a document prepared 
by the authors to explain the database development, history and breadth of firms included 
they titled “Guide to the Firm Database of Emerging Growth Initial Public Offerings 




Table 2 goes about here 
_____________________________ 
While the database is a result of exhaustive research to gather all relevant firms, it 
excludes firms going through the IPO process that were not emerging growth firms such 
as mutual funds and real estate investment trusts (REITS).  These restrictions on entry into 
the database are explained by the authors in Table 3, another set of excerpts of “Guide to 
the Firm Database of Emerging Growth Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)from 1990 through 
2015.”   
_____________________________ 
Table 3 goes about here 
_____________________________ 
 
Table 4 is a list of variables in the database, also from “Guide to the Firm Database of 
Emerging Growth Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)from 1990 through 2015.”  
_____________________________ 




 There were six key measures in my research.  In terms of activity by the subject 
firm, there will be four possible measures 
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Kirznerian venture – An entrepreneurial venture involving: (1) a 
significantly different (novel) product, service or customer logistics than 
previously offered by the competition; that (2) would not be possible but for 
the alertness to existing market conditions, possibly an element of surprise, 
by the firm to develop the significantly different product, service or 
customer logistics. 
tech-maker venture – An entrepreneurial venture involving: (1) a 
significantly different (novel) product, service or customer logistics than 
previously offered by the competition; that (2) would not be possible but for 
a technological, change developed by the firm.  Any such technical 
invention/innovation must be sophisticated enough to require specialized 
experience or training in the applicable art of the invention to develop it.  
Kirznerian and tech-maker venture – A venture meeting the criteria of 
both categories.  
performance venture - A venture to sell (A) the same basic products or 
services (possibly with improved features) as the competition through the 
same customer logistic channels; competing on basis of faster or otherwise 
preferable delivery, better price, better quality, or an improved version of 
the product or service or (B) a new product developed by a third party. 
 In terms of technological environment, specifically the availability of recent 




tech-enabled venture – A venture that would not be possible but for: (1) a 
technological invention/innovation/change developed by a third-party and 
available to the entrepreneur and/or its customers as need be no more than 
the eight years prior to the firm founding.    
not tech-enabled venture– Not a tech-enabled venture, not a venture that 
meets the requirements to be a tech-enabled venture.   
 I classified a firm as tech-maker or Kirznerian if it made any claim at all of such 
applicable accomplishment in its SEC filings.  I classified a firm as tech-enabled only if its 
business model absolutely required a new technology by a third party.  An example of this 
would be a one product firm bringing a new drug to market that has been licensed to it by 
a large pharmaceutical firm.   
Extracting Data from SEC Documents 
The main SEC document that I reviewed was  S-1 filings.  It is a reliable source of 
information.  Every firm going public must file an S-1 (or an SB-1 for small businesses) 
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prior to its initial public stock 
offering (IPO).  The S-1 is a requirement for all firms going public, except certain small 
firms can instead file an SB-1 which is a slightly simpler version of an S-1.  Both forms 
contain more than adequate information for the purposes of this dissertation.  As explained 
below, the information relied upon by me from the SEC forms tends to be very reliable.  
The IPO has two effects on a firm going public. First, it provides the firm with 
capital for continued expansion. Second, after the IPO, the equity stakes of both 
management and other pre-IPO investors, (subject to certain lock-up delays) becomes 
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liquid.  Management and other pre-IPO investors usually agree not to sell their stock until 
a period after time after the IPO and this is referred to as a lock-up period. 
In return though, the firm must conform to the reporting and transparency 
requirements imposed by the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933.  The Securities Act of 
1933 requires companies making a public offering of their securities to publicly disclose 
relevant business and financial information about their company so that potential investors 
can make an informed investment decision regarding the offering. Specifically, the 1933 
Act requires companies going public to file disclosure documents with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the most important of which are the general form S-1 registration 
statement1 and the 424B prospectus. 
 For my research, there were two key sections of the S-1 that I reviewed: (1) the 
general business description; and (2) the required disclosure of risks for the investors.  
Critically for my research, the risk disclosures set forth risks that bear on my tech-enabled 
determination such as reliance on a third party’s technology.  These risk disclosure 
statements in the S-1 must be accurate, or else the firm and its officers could be subject to 
civil penalties or even criminal penalties for securities fraud. 
I will present details of one S-1 statement in this section to illustrate the value, depth 
and accuracy of an S-1.  I will use a firm called Macrogenics’ S-1 to illustrate the features 
of the S-1 form.  The S-1 forms had a standard format to them.  They all had a similar table 
 
1 From this point forward, I will generically use the term S-1 to mean both S-1 and SB-1 
forms.  Both forms contain the same relevant information for purposes of this 
dissertation.   
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of contents.  Below is a sample table of contents from the S-1 for a company called 
Macrogenics: 
Prospectus Summary        1 
Risk Factors         11 
Special Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements     44 
Use of Proceeds        46 
Dividend Policy         47 
Capitalization         48 
Dilution         50 
Selected Consolidated Financial Data       52 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations  54 
Business          76 
Management         122 
Certain Relationships and Related Party Transactions     136 
Principal Stockholders        137 
Description of Capital Stock        141 
Shares Eligible for Future Sale       146 
Material U.S. Federal Tax Consequences for Non-U.S. Holders    148 
Underwriting         152 
Legal Matters         159 
Experts          159 
Where You Can Find More Information       159 
 
Although the order varies somewhat, the S-1s all have the same items in their table 
of contents.  For purposes of my research, the three sections I used were (1) Prospectus 
Summary, (2) Risk Factors and (3) Business.  The rest of the sections contain a wealth of 
information for investors but usually were not relevant to my research. 
The first section that I always looked at was the Prospectus Summary.  An excerpt 
of Macrogenics Summary is below: 
We are a clinical-stage biopharmaceutical company focused on discovering 
and developing innovative monoclonal antibody-based therapeutics for the 
treatment of cancer and autoimmune diseases. We generate our pipeline of 
product candidates from our proprietary suite of next-generation antibody 
technology platforms, . . . The combination of our technology platforms and 
antibody engineering expertise has allowed us to generate promising 
product candidates and enter into several strategic collaborations with 
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global pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies. These collaborations 
provide us with funding and allow us to leverage the additional expertise of 
our collaborators to advance the development of our product candidates. 
This summary is not proof of, but suggestive of, two things: (1) even though it is a 
pharmaceutical company, it may not be a tech-maker because of the description of itself as 
“clinical stage” and because of its collaborations and (2) it may be tech-enabled because of 
the collaboration agreements. 
 The Risk Factors section of the S-1 reveals more information.  One warning is: 
We may be unable to obtain orphan product designation or 
exclusivity for some or all of our product candidates. If our 
competitors are able to obtain orphan product exclusivity for their 
products that are the same as our product candidates, we may not 
be able to have competing products approved by the applicable 
regulatory authority for a significant period of time. 
Each warning such as this one is followed by a lengthy discussion of the risk.    
The quest for orphan drug status does not prove, but suggests that this may be a 
circumstance of an IPO firm developing products invented by a large pharmaceutical firm 
because this arrangement is common with orphan drugs.  In the pharmaceutical context, 
the term develop generally means take an already patented product through FDA testing.  
Often, the IPO firm is a firm that has no function other than taking a product through the 
FDA process after a large firm or university has invented the product, not a tech-maker 
inventing its own product.  In this scenario, the IPO firm usually sells or otherwise passes 
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off the manufacturing, distribution and sale of the product; and might not even do its own 
FDA (clinical) testing.  It is basically a financing vehicle for the FDA testing.  
The following warnings suggest that might be the case here - - not a full-fledged 
cutting-edge technical firm developing breakthrough technology - - in the language of this 
dissertation, not a tech-maker 
Our existing therapeutic collaborations are important to our business, 
and future collaborations may also be important to us. If we are 
unable to maintain any of these collaborations, or if these 
collaborations are not successful, our business could be adversely 
affected. 
This warning suggests the possibility that the firm may not be the actual inventor of their 
product if it has collaboration agreements to do R&D testing for other firms. 
Independent clinical investigators and CROs that we engage to 
conduct our clinical trials may not devote sufficient time or attention 
to our clinical trials or be able to repeat their past success. 
Thus, the firm had only one function, clinical testing, and it contracted even that out. 
 The following disclosures show the firm had no manufacturing or sales capabilities, 
and was even relying on third parties to manufacture. 
We expect to contract with third parties for the manufacture of our 
product candidates for clinical testing in the future and expect to 
continue to do so for commercialization. This reliance on third parties 
increases the risk that we will not have sufficient quantities of our 
product candidates or products or such quantities at an acceptable 
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cost, which could delay, prevent or impair our development or 
commercialization efforts. 
We currently have no marketing, sales or distribution infrastructure. 
If we are unable to develop sales, marketing and distribution 
capabilities on our own or through collaborations, we will not be 
successful in commercializing our product candidates. 
Failure of our third party contractors to successfully develop and 
commercialize companion diagnostics for use with our product 
candidates could harm our ability to commercialize our product 
candidates. 
We have incurred significant losses since inception and anticipate 
that we will continue to incur losses for the foreseeable future. We 
have no products approved for commercial sale, and to date we have 
not generated any revenue or profit from product sales. We may 
never achieve or sustain profitability. 
The following warnings demonstrate the financial risks of the firm. 
We will require substantial additional funding, which may not be 
available to us on acceptable terms, or at all, and, if not available, 
may require us to delay, scale back, or cease our product 
development programs or operations. 
 The following warning suggests that the firm may not be working with a new 
product, but improvement to products that others already have.  At a minimum, it strongly 
suggests that the products are not Kirznerian.   
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We face significant competition and if our competitors develop and 
market products that are more effective, safer or less expensive than 
our product candidates, our commercial opportunities will be 
negatively impacted. 
 
 The following warnings suggest that the firm may not have a truly new product, 
only an improvement to an existing product. Moreover, an improved version that is actually 
designed by and invented somebody else, the licensors of the patents the firm operates 
under.  
We face significant competition and if our competitors develop and 
market products that are more effective, safer or less expensive than 
our product candidates, our commercial opportunities will be 
negatively impacted. 
If any product liability lawsuits are successfully brought against us or 
any of our collaborators, we may incur substantial liabilities and may 
be required to limit commercialization of our product candidates. 
If we fail to comply with our obligations under our intellectual property 
licenses with third parties, we could lose license rights that are 
important to our business. 
There generally cannot be competition for a new product.  Moreover, collaborators 
generally cannot be liable unless they are the inventors of the product.  The patent licenses 




 The firm started when the patented inventions of others that it was using were new 
technology of others, so it was classified as tech-enabled for its environmental 
classification.  It would be tempting to not classify the firm as performance 
entrepreneurship instead of tech-maker for its activity, but one part of the S-1 form 
indicated it should be classified as a tech-maker.   
 One of the warnings provides: 
If we are unable to obtain and enforce patent protection for our 
product candidates and related technology, our business could be 
materially harmed. 
The firm’s business model included possibly obtaining patents for combinations of others’ 
inventions.  Since the proposed business model includes patenting some processes learned 
from the FDA testing by combining inventions of others, I classified this firm as a tech-
maker.  Of note, a patent can be obtained for combinations of already patented inventions 
of others, and that appears to be the case here.  A patent holder of an invention combining 
patented inventions of others cannot make his or her patented product without licenses 
from the underlying patent holders, but he or she has the exclusive rights to use the patented 
invention, unless he or she grants licenses for others to use it.   
The firm could be profitable without getting the intended patents.  However, since 
the firm had patents figured in its projected business, I classified it as a tech-maker.  I 
followed my classification rule that a firm is classified as a tech-maker or Kirznerian firm 
if it has any claim of having a new product, service or customer logistics.  This firm was 
not classified as Kirznerian because it was attempting to develop a product with an obvious 
demand that others were attempting to develop. 
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 I illustrated the S-1 format with this pharmaceutical firm for five reasons.  First, 
pharmaceutical firms were the most difficult to classify.  Also, the pharmaceutical firm 
example shows the rich information that can be gleamed from an S-1 form.  Third, it is an 
example of the methodological nature that I went through to classify firms.  Fourth, it 
showed my emphasis and rigor to classify firms as a category contrary to the hypotheses I 
proposed.  Fifth, it shows the collaboration of entrepreneurial firms with large firms, a point 
not discussed in the entrepreneurship literature. 
Sample 
To test the hypotheses, I developed a sample of ventures that went through an initial 
public offering in the U.S. market during 1995-2015.  Given that IPO markets experience 
major fluctuations and considering that there is no such thing as a “typical” IPO year, the 
time frame selected spans through different periods of IPO activity levels. For example, 
there was a boom in IPOs leading up to the Dot Com Boom in 2001 and a real decline in 
IPOs after the 2008 Financial Crisis.  For my sample, I gathered a sample at a minimum 
525 firms selected from my data source (minimum of 25 per year) from the list of firms in 
the time period.  These firms were randomly selected.   
I classified firms in the sample as (1) performance entrepreneurship firms, (2) 
Kirznerian firms and/or (3) tech-maker firms based on their activity.  Further, I classified 
them as tech-enabled ventures or not tech-enabled based on their technological 
environment. 
For Hypothesis 1, I looked at the prevalence of performance entrepreneurship firms 
in comparison to the prevalence of firms with the other alternative classifications.   
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For Hypothesis 2, I ran regression analyses to assess whether there were significant 
increases in the prevalence of firms that are both performance entrepreneurship firms and 
tech-enabled firms.  Further, I compared groups of firms from the same different time 
periods using to see if there are differences between the groups.  For Hypothesis 3, I looked 








 I randomly selected firms to produce a sample with 25 or more firms for each of 
the years 1995 – 2015 except for two years.  Two of the years in that timeframe had less 
than 25 IPOs involving emerging growth firms as defined above. The year 2008 had only 
ten such IPOs and 2009 had only 14 IPOs. From these two years, I put all the firms going 
through IPOs in my sample. Thus, 2008 had only 10 firms in the sample and 2009 at only 
14 firms in the sample.  An explanation of my random selection process is described in 
Table 5. 
 Once the sample was selected, I assigned each firm two classifications.  As outlined 
above I assigned each firm a classification based on the firm’s activity and a second 
classification for its technological environment. Next, I computed the prevalence of the 
different classifications in each of the years 1995 – 2015. 
Generally, I expected a low prevalence of performance entrepreneurship firms in 
the early years (1990s) with the prevalence of the performance entrepreneurship firms 
growing over the 21 years. This expectation is inherent in my hypotheses. This expectation 
was based on an assumption that turned out to be wrong.  I believed that the faster better 
cheaper phenomenon was just starting in the early years and had growing momentum over 
the 21 years.  Thus, I expected a low prevalence of performance entrepreneurship firms in 
the early years and a high prevalence in later years. 
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The research results support the expectation of a high prevalence of performance 
entrepreneurial firms in later years. However, the results contradict the expectation of a 
low prevalence performance entrepreneurship firms in the early years of the sample.  
Looking at Figures 2-4, it can be seen that there are no real trends over the timeframe. 
    Table 6 is a summary setting forth the prevalence of the different classifications of 
firms for each year. As indicated in Table 6, the prevalence of performance 
entrepreneurship firms was already high in 1995 at 85%.  This high percentage of 
performance entrepreneurship had a temporal aspect to it. From 1995 to 2000, the ranks of 
the IPO firms were dominated by firms getting into ventures related to the new technology, 
the Internet. These firms were not firms attempting to develop new technology, but instead 
firms attempting to build businesses around use of the technology. 
However, even after the dot.com bubble burst in 2001, the prevalence of 
performance entrepreneurship firms remained high. At the same time, the prevalence of 
tech-maker firms remained low. Figure 2 is a chart showing the prevalence of tech-maker 
firms for each of the years and Figure 3 is a chart showing the prevalence of performance 
entrepreneurship firms.  Figure 4 is a chart showing the prevalence of tech-enabled/ 
performance firms.  The chart shows that the prevalence of these firms remained relatively 
steady. 
Going beyond the sample for this dissertation and considering the actual percentage 
of tech-maker firms among the population of all firms in the winter in IPO in the timeframe 
1995 – 2015, the 16.0% figure inflates the actual percentage of tech-maker firms.  This is 
because the annual numbers of IPO firms in the earlier stages of the 1995 – 2015 timeframe 
were large compared to the annual number of firms in the later years and the percentage of 
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tech-maker firms were low in the early years.  An accurate assessment of tech-maker firms 
would require a weighting of the samples for the various years in this would drive down 
the percentage of tech-maker firms because there were large numbers of IPOs in the early 
years of the time frame while at the same time there were very low percentages of tech-
maker firms 
Looking at figure 2, one can see that there is no decline in tech-maker firms over 
the sample timeframe. Actually, there is a slight uptick in the prevalence of tech-maker 
firms in the last three years of the sample timeframe. This increase was driven by a surge 
in pharmaceutical IPOs. In the 2013 – 2015 timeframe, roughly 35% of the IPOs were 
pharmaceutical. I briefly looked at material on this surge and could not find a concrete 
reason for this surge. Business journals suggested one of two reasons for the surge: (1) 
recent scientific breakthroughs in genetics that are available to the public have generated 
new pharmaceuticals based on the recently developed genetic science; and (2) portions of 
the VC industry gearing up with extra pharmaceutical expertise to invest in pharmaceutical 
firms. Regardless, prevalence of tech-maker firms remained low averaging 26%.   
The percentage of tech-maker firms (26%) is lower than the percentage of 
pharmaceutical firms (35%) for two reasons: (1) not all pharmaceutical firms are tech-
maker firms - - some market drugs invented by other parties under patent licenses or 
assignments from the inventors; and (2) almost all tech-maker firms are in the 
pharmaceutical space.   
There was a real variety of performance entrepreneurship ventures.  The lineup 
included coal mines, sand mines, gold mines, oil producers, natural gas producers, natural 
gas processors, natural gas transporters, commercial banks, consumer banks, mortgage 
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companies, insurance companies, brick and mortar retailers and wholesalers, steel 
manufacturers, contract manufacturers, homebuilders, clinics, temporary staff agencies, 
outsourcing operations, medical groups and others.  The IT venture was the most common 
type of performance entrepreneurship venture.   
Three technologies were the most common source of tech-enabled ventures: (1) 
genetic science, (2) fracking technology and (3) far and away the most common, the 
internet.  Genetic science was behind many of the pharmaceutical firms.  While better than 
half of the pharmaceutical firms were  
The tech-maker venture category was dominated by pharmaceutical firms.  Some 
of the pharmaceutical firms were not classified as tech-maker because they were marketing 
drugs invented by others.  It is relevant to note that pursuant to my measures, if a firm made 
any claim at all of having a hand in inventing a product, I classified it as tech-maker.   
Interestingly, many of these tech-maker firms were working in collaboration with 
large pharmaceutical firms.  It sometimes was not clear who was the real inventor 
(originator) of the subject product when the IPO firm was collaborating with a big pharma 
firm on research.  Consistent with my scoring guidelines, I scored these unclear situations 
as tech-makers, even though they may not have really been tech-makers.  Consequently, 
the real prevalence of tech-maker firms may be lower than reported in the results for this 
reason.    
The risk disclosures show a strong link between Big Pharma and the entrepreneurial 
firms.  The following risk disclosure by an IPO firm Neose discloses the tightness of this 
link that occurred repeatedly in the pharmaceutical setting: 
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Dependence on Abbott; Dependence on Other Collaborative Partners. The 
Company’s strategic alliance with Abbott provides, in part, for the receipt by 
the Company of certain license fees, milestone payments, and, if 
commercialization occurs, royalty payments. The Company has derived 
substantially all of its revenues to date from its strategic alliance with Abbott 
and anticipates that payments from Abbott will constitute all or substantial 
portion of its revenues for the next several years. 
 
I classified this firm as a tech-maker, even though it had its research funded by Abbott, 
had plans to have Abbott market its drugs and had all of its revenue received from 
Abbott.  Following my classification rules, I classified it as a tech-maker because it was 
inventing its own products.   
 With some IPO firms though, the nature of the alliance and collaboration 
precluded a tech-maker designation.  The risk disclosures of an IPO firm Ventrus 
confirmed it did not have a product that it developed on its own.  This disclosure 
confirms that it was not the inventor of its only products: 
Our license agreement with S.L.A. Pharma is subject to termination if this 
offering is not completed by September 30, 2010 or if a third party wishes 
to license VEN 307 and VEN 308 in certain events. 
 
We have in-licensed the rights to VEN 307 and VEN 308 from S.L.A. 
Pharma. Pursuant to a December 18, 2009 amendment to the license 
agreement between us, in the event we do not complete this offering by 
September 30, 2010 with net proceeds of at least $10 million, S.L.A. 
Pharma may terminate the license agreement immediately. In addition, 
S.L.A. Pharma may terminate the license agreement with one month’s 
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notice in the event that a third party wishes to enter into a license agreement 
for VEN 307 and VEN 308, provided that within that 30-day period we have 
not paid all then required payments under the agreement and provided 
further that S.L.A. 
This disclosure shows the control that big pharma exerts over the entrepreneurial IPO 
firms.  Big pharma provides various resources, but with strict conditions.   
 
The evidence does support Hypothesis 1 (that the majority of firms reaching the 
IPO stage are in fact performance entrepreneurship firms, not tech-maker or Kirznerian). 
Performance entrepreneurship firms were 83.0% of the firms, tech-maker firms were 
15,9% and Kirznerian firms were 1.9%.  The prevalence of Kirznerian firms was very low. 
During most years, the sample of firms did not contain any Kirznerian firms. This average 
in the sample overstates the average percentage of Kirznerian firms (both inside and outside 
the sample) because of the large number of firms reaching IPOs in the early stages of the 
1995 – 2015 timeframe and the high percentage of performance entrepreneurship firms 
during the early stages.  
I ran z tests to assess whether or not the data is strong enough to say with confidence 
that the percentage of performance entrepreneurship firms is actually greater than the 
percentage of Kirznerian firms or tech-maker firms. First, I performed a two sample z test 
to compare the means of (1) the percentage of performance entrepreneurship firms and (2) 
the percentage of tech-maker firms. The null hypothesis for this test was that the two means 
were equal.  At a 99% confidence level, the null hypothesis that the two means are the same 
was rejected (p < .01). The figures for this test are set forth in Table 8. 
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Next, I ran a test comparing the percentage of performance entrepreneurship firms 
and the percentage of Kirznerian firms. Similarly, I set the percentages of the two types of 
firms being equal as the null hypothesis (p < .01).  At a 99% confidence level, the null 
hypothesis that the two means are the same was rejected. The figures for this test are set 
forth in Table 9. Thus, the testing does not contradict a conclusion that the prevalence of 
performance entrepreneurship firms (at roughly 83%) is greater than the prevalence of 
tech-maker firms (at roughly 16%) and the prevalence of Kirznerian firms (at roughly 2%). 
The data did not support Hypothesis 2 (that the prevalence of firms that are both 
tech-enabled and performance entrepreneurship firms is growing). As previously 
discussed, contrary to expectations, the prevalence of performance entrepreneurship firms 
was very high at the beginning of the timeframe. Also, at the outset of the timeframe, the 
prevalence of tech-enabled firms was substantial (42% on average). This percentage is 
much higher than the percentage of tech-maker firms (16%) and Kirznerian (2%). 
However, the data does support Hypothesis 3 (that prevalence of firms that are both 
tech-enabled and performance entrepreneurship is substantial).  The prevalence of tech-
enabled firms was substantial (42% on average). This percentage is much higher than the 
percentage of tech-maker firms (16%) and Kirznerian firms (2%). 
To summarize the findings of the data, overarching conclusions that can be reached 
concerning IPO firms in the timeframe are: 
a. the majority of the firms are performance entrepreneurship firms in the 
sample (approximately 83%); 
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b. tech-maker firms are a small percentage of the firms (approximately 16%) 
in the sample; 
c. Kirznerian firms are only a very small percentage of the firms 
(approximately 2 or 3%);  
d. the percentage of tech-enabled firms is high (approximately 49%) in the 
sample; and 
e. firms that are both tech-enabled and performance entrepreneurship firms are 
not a majority of the firms, but they are a substantial percentage of the firms 
(approximately 40%) in the sample. 
Contrary to expectations, there were not trends of increasing prevalence of tech-
enabled firms, trends of increasing prevalence of firms that were both tech-enabled and 
performance entrepreneurship firms, or trends of decreasing prevalence of performance 
entrepreneurship firms. At the beginning of the subject timeframe, there are already was 
(1) a high prevalence of tech-enabled firms and performance entrepreneurship firms 








DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Theory Contributions 
This dissertation extends the entrepreneurship literature and theory five ways. First, 
it brings to light a critically important role that entrepreneurs play in bringing benefits of 
technological advances to society. Although this study does not support the view a view 
that entrepreneurs are frequent inventors of new technological breakthroughs, it highlights 
a critical role that entrepreneurs play in bringing technological advances to society. Quite 
often, the underlying inventors of technological breakthroughs lack expertise in developing 
the many beneficial uses of its technology. Entrepreneurs feel a critical role by utilizing 
their niche expertise to bring the benefits of the novel technology to their respective niche 
markets. 
Second, this dissertation extends the entrepreneurship theory by taking a broader 
look at innovation and shining light on a type of innovation not extensively covered in the 
modern entrepreneurship literature - - the innovation of faster better cheaper - - incremental 
innovation.   
Entrepreneurship literature focuses on innovation to develop new products to avoid 
competition - - radical innovation or disruptive innovation which is creating new products 
or services  However, I note that there are other types of innovation.  Another type of 
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innovation, incremental innovation is characterized by faster better or cheaper versions of 
existing products or services, either an improved version of the product or service, better 
delivery of the same product or service, or offering the same product or service at a better 
price.  These results of this dissertation suggest that incremental innovation may be a 
common, if not the dominant, innovation utilized by entrepreneurs.  This type of innovation 
has not been covered in the entrepreneurship literature.   
Third, this dissertation brings rare empirical evidence to the theoretical debates on 
the efforts of entrepreneurs to launch ventures.  Despite extensive attention paid to the 
theoretical debate concerning the origins of entrepreneurial ventures and how 
entrepreneurs select ventures to pursue, empirical research on these topics remains limited. 
This dissertation contributes new empirical evidence by looking at the ventures pursued by 
entrepreneurial high-growth firms.  By looking at 568 firms that have achieved high-
growth, this dissertation contributes to the literature by giving insight into what high-
growth firms actually do. The field of entrepreneurship cannot advance until an 
understanding is developed of what entrepreneurs actually do (Aldrich & Ruef, 2019). 
This dissertation contributes to the entrepreneurship literature for a fourth reason – 
– it points out the prevalence and profit potential of the performance entrepreneur. While 
early scholars may have had definitions of entrepreneurship broad enough to include the 
performance entrepreneur, the performance entrepreneur has been all but forgotten in the 
entrepreneurship literature of the last 50 years. This dissertation brings the performance 
entrepreneur back into the discussion of what entrepreneurship actually is.  Finally, this 
dissertation demonstrates what is not necessary to have a highly successful venture.  An 
innovative novel product or service is not needed. 
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This dissertation also extends strategy theory. A critical issue in RBV strategy 
research is how do firms purchase the resources they need at prices that allow them to 
create a competitive advantage (Barney, 1986). Barney (1986) opines that the expense of 
gaining information that is available to the competition does not fall into this category. 
However, Barney does not offer information on how firms develop valuable information 
that is private or exactly what it is. This dissertation contributes to strategy literature by 
empirically showing examples of what the nature of such information can be for 
entrepreneurs.   
Further, this dissertation adds to economics literature by providing some empirical 
research into Schumpeter theories that have not been tested extensively.  Schumpeter 
(1942) said that technological innovation would increasingly become the domain of large 
established firms and this dissertation provides some empirical evidence to support this 
theory.  There were only a small percentage of IPO firms that claimed a technological 
innovation.  Schumpeter (1934,1939, 1942) opined that entrepreneurial opportunities arise 
for entrepreneurial firms from exogenous change.  Supporting this view of Schumpeter is 
the data that over40% of the IPO firms had a business model that depended on recent 
technological change.   
Limitations 
This dissertation has limitations.  Although the research is longitudinal covering 
the time period 1995 – 2015, there is a temporal nature to it.  The economy is dynamic. 
Changes to the economy in the future may render the conclusions of this dissertation 
flawed.  Further, this research is limited in geographic scope to firms achieving an IPO in 
US markets.  Although this restriction does not necessarily limit the sample to US based 
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firms, it does severely limit the sample to US firms and foreign firms in which US investors 
will invest.  Firms from other countries may operate under different circumstances. 
Another limitation is the sample size.  Although it is relatively large (568 firms), it 
could be larger.  A larger sample size could produce different results.   
The sample generated herein is not a generalizable sample of all entrepreneurs and 
this is a limitation of the sample However, it is not intended to be a generalizable sample 
of all entrepreneurs.  It is certainly a generalizable sample of IPO firms in the 1995-2015 
timeframe and it arguably generalizable to high-growth firms.  Although this dissertation 
may not tell you what is necessary to achieve success as a high growth firm, it surely tells 
you what is not necessary - - a clever new product that nobody else thought of before.   
Practitioner Value 
 This research has valuable information for the practitioner.  For the aspiring 
entrepreneur, it gives guidance on what type of venture to pursue, pointing out the lack of 
a need for a novel product.  Further, it can guide the aspiring entrepreneur to consider (1) 
opportunities arising from technological change and (2) faster better cheaper opportunities.  
Perhaps more importantly, it points out the danger of not keeping abreast of faster better 
cheaper. 
Future Research 
This dissertation points to directions for future research.  Future research could look 
at change other than technological change generating entrepreneurial opportunities.  In 
reviewing the SEC filings, it became apparent that (1) change other than technological 
change generates entrepreneurial opportunities and (2) a high percentage of successful 
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entrepreneurs are taking advantage of some type of recent change.  In the sample, I was 
not looking for it, but I noticed other types of change frequently being the catalyst for 
ventures.  Future research can follow up in other ways. 
First, future studies could look at the prevalence of tech-enabled/performance 
entrepreneurship firms among non-IPO firms, particularly high-growth firms that do have 
high-growth, but not enough growth to reach the IPO stage.  Second, future studies can be 
done to update the research in this dissertation. 
Third, future research can be done to look at industries that enable high-growth 
entrepreneurship.  In the study, the overwhelming majority of tech-maker firms were in the 
biotechnology space.  Why does this industry spawn so many more IPO firms than the rest 
of the industries?  Is it economies of scale, regulations, taxes, risk/reward tradeoffs desired 
by investors, location of talent or other factors? 
Fourth, future studies could look at the skills required to be a successful tech-
enabled/performance entrepreneur.  Although there has been considerable research on the 
entrepreneur/non-entrepreneur distinctions, there has not been extensive research on the 
successful/non-successful entrepreneur generally, let alone the traits required to be a 
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Calendar Utility Design Plant       Patents 
Year Patent Patent  Patent Utility Design Plant to Foreign 
  Applications  Applications Applications Patents Patents Patents Residents 
2015 589,410 39,097 1,140 298,407 25,986 1,074 169,763 
2014 578,802 35,378 1,063 300,678 23,657 1,072 166,999 
2013 571,612 36,034 1,406 277,835 23,468 847 154,891 
2012 542,815 32,799 1,149 253,155 21,951 860 142,180 
2011 503,582 30,467 1,139 224,505 21,356 823 125,998 
2010 490,226 29,059 992 219,614 22,799 981 122,694 
2009 456,106 25,806 959 167,349 23,116 1,009 96,677 
2008 456,321 27,782 1,209 157,772 25,565 1,240 92,929 
2007 456,154 27,752 1,049 157,282 24,062 1,047 89,007 
2006 425,967 25,515 1,151 173,772 20,965 1,149 93,942 
2005 390,733 25,553 1,222 143,806 12,951 716 75,046 
2004 356,943 23,975 1,221 164,290 15,695 1,016 87,051 
2003 342,441 22,602 1,000 169,023 16,574 994 88,258 
2002 334,445 20,904 1,144 167,331 15,451 1,133 87,101 
2001 326,508 18,280 944 166,035 16,871 584 85,173 
2000 295,926 18,292 797 157,494 17,413 548 78,871 
1999 270,187 17,761 863 153,485 14,732 420 74,877 
1998 243,062 17,107 720 147,517 14,766 561 72,398 
1997 215,257 16,546 621 111,984 11,414 394 54,107 
1996 195,187 15,161 665 109,645 11,410 362 52,267 
1995 212,377 15,409 452 101,419 11,712 387 49,327 
1994 189,857 15,774 459 101,676 11,095 499 49,224 
1993 174,743 13,635 361 98,342 10,630 442 48,531 
1992 173,075 13,078 354 97,444 9,269 321 48,572 
1991 164,306 13,061 463 96,511 9,569 353 48,944 
1990 164,558 11,288 418 90,365 8,024 318 46,094 
1989 152,750 12,615 383 95,537 6,092 587 47,804 










History of Database 
 
This database is the product of many years of effort. Originally this project was directed to 
parsing the IPO registration documents of just the semiconductor, biotechnology, and 
telecom equipment IPOs from 1996 through 2000. Based on the research value of these 
efforts (Kenney and Patton 2005, Patton and Kenney 2005), this work was expanded to 
include all de novo IPOs from June 1996 through 2000. 
 
A second effort was mounted to build a database from 2001 through 2006 with support from 
the National Science Foundation – Geography and Regional Sciences (NSF 0647838). A third 
stage to collect this data for the years 1990 through 1996 was completed with funding from 
the Science of Science Policy program of the National Science Foundation (NSF 0915257). 
 
Based on our work with Jay Ritter for the Kauffman Foundation on employment and revenue 
growth of firms following their IPO (Kenney, Patton, and Ritter 2012), we have also extended 
our database to include the time period from June 1996 through the year 2010. As part of our 
ongoing research on IPOs and new firm formation we have recently expanded this database 





 This guide deals with the data about the firm going public and the offering itself, and is a 
complete database of emerging growth, de novo firms going public on American exchanges 





 Our definition of emerging growth companies differs from the definition used in the 2012 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act. This bill defines emerging growth companies to 
be any company with annual revenue of less than $1 billion. Our definition of emerging 
growth companies is based on their status as de novo and is not based on their revenue at 
the time of their IPO. Therefore, our definition includes the IPOs of Google and Facebook, 















This database is comprised of all emerging growth initial public offerings (IPOs) on American 
stock exchanges and filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from January 
1990 through December 2015. In assembling the set of firms to be included we relied on 
Thomson Financial Venture Expert, SDC data, IPOScoop.com, and other sources to generate a 
list of all IPOs over this time period. From this list the following types of firms and filings were 
excluded: mutual funds, real estate investment trusts (REITs), asset acquisition or blank check 
companies, foreign F-1 filers, firms that had gone public at an earlier time, and all spin-offs 
and other firms that were not true de novo, emerging growth firms. 
 
Data Reviewed to Determine if Restricted 
 
Every firm going public must file a prospectus with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission prior to its initial public stock offering. The IPO is a defining event in the history 
of any firm, and it performs two functions. First, it provides the firm with capital so that it can 
continue its expansion. Second, after the IPO, the stakes of both management and investors, 
(subject to certain lock-up delays) becomes liquid. In return, the firm must conform to the 
reporting and transparency requirements imposed by the SEC under the Securities Act of 
1933. One of the primary objectives of the Securities Act of 1933 is to require companies 
making a public offering of their securities to publicly disclose relevant business and financial 
information about their company so that potential investors can make an informed 
investment decision regarding the offering. To achieve this end the 1933 Act requires 
companies going public to file disclosure documents with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the most important of which are the general form S-1 registration statement 
and the 424B prospectus. 
 
 This database has been constructed directly from these registration statements and 
prospectuses. These documents were found on the SEC's Electronic Data, Gathering and 
Retrieval (EDGAR) website. Up until the advent of the SEC's EDGAR system, IPO registration 
statements and other SEC documents were filed in paper form in officially designated 
locations and libraries. Beginning in the 1980s the SEC began to provide Internet access to 
these documents through its EDGAR program, but it wasn't until June 1996 that public firms 
were required to file all of their documents in this format. Therefore, a complete EDGAR 
record of all IPO documents for firms going public only begins in June 1996. 
 
 For IPOs prior to June 1996 we have relied on IPO registration statements and 
prospectuses that were originally found in paper form. These documents were found at the 
Stanford Graduate School of Business Library in either pdf or TIFF format. It is from these 










Sources of Variables 
 
This database contains variables that pertain to the firm going public and the offering itself. 
Each firm is assigned a Central Index Key by the SEC which we are using as the firm's unique 
identifier. All of the variables in this database are extracted from each firm's prospectus (form 
424B) or the firm's registration statement (form S-1). 
 
Main Variables Sources from SEC filings 
 
Company ID: The firm's Central Index Key (CIK) assigned by the SEC. This is used as the unique 
identifier of each firm in this database. If a firm was no longer publicly traded by the time 
EDGAR was initiated, it would not have a CIK. In these cases, we assigned a unique ID to the 
firm. 
 
Company Name: Firm name at the time of the IPO. 
 
IPO Year: The year of the IPO. 
 
State of Incorporation: State of incorporation at the time of the IPO. 
 
Company Street 1, 
Company Street 2, 










SEC SIC: This is the 4 digit Standard Industrial Code (SIC) assigned to the firm by the SEC's 
Division of Corporate Finance. 
 
Primary SIC: This is the 4 digit SIC found in the firm’s S-1 registration statement. This is the SIC 
the firm going public assigns to itself, and on occasion it does not agree with the SEC SIC. 
 






Random Selection Process 
 
 
Random Selection Process for Selecting Firms in a Year 
Step 1 
Start with a list of the firms from database for that year in alphabetical order. 
Step 2 
Count the number of firms. 
Step 3 
If the number of firms is 25 or less, put all the firms in the sample. 
Step 4 
Determine if the number of firms can be divided by a number that results in a number 
between 25 and 29 (plus a possible remainder).  For example, if there would be 77 in the 
sample, you could divide by 3 and get an answer of 25, remainder 2. 
Step 5 
If so, randomly select every nth firm in the list starting from the bottom.  In the example of 
77, you would start at the bottom and pick every 3rd firm. 
Step 6 
If not, if one dividing by one number produces too few and one number produces too many, 
Divide by the number that produces too and randomly select the remaining firms from the 


















1995 14.8% 85.2% 0.0% 40.7% 37.0% 
1996 17.9% 82.1% 0.0% 53.6% 53.6% 
1997 11.1% 88.9% 0.0% 37.0% 25.9% 
1998 16.0% 84.0% 0.0% 44.0% 44.0% 
1999 0.0% 92.6% 7.4% 92.6% 92.6% 
2000 7.7% 92.3% 7.7% 80.8% 76.9% 
2001 6.7% 93.3% 3.3% 40.0% 36.7% 
2002 8.0% 92.0% 4.0% 36.0% 32.0% 
2003 7.7% 92.3% 0.0% 30.8% 30.8% 
2004 23.1% 76.9% 0.0% 57.7% 42.3% 
2005 18.5% 81.5% 3.7% 11.1% 7.4% 
2006 7.7% 88.5% 3.8% 23.1% 23.1% 
2007 32.0% 68.0% 0.0% 64.0% 52.0% 
2008 40.0% 60.0% 0.0% 40.0% 20.0% 
2009 7.1% 92.9% 0.0% 71.4% 57.1% 
2010 12.0% 88.0% 0.0% 60.0% 56.0% 
2011 8.6% 85.7% 5.7% 51.4% 45.7% 
2012 17.9% 82.1% 0.0% 64.3% 53.6% 
2013 28.6% 71.4% 0.0% 0.0% 28.6% 
2014 20.0% 80.0% 0.0% 56.0% 48.0% 
2015 29.3% 65.5% 5.2% 46.6% 31.0% 











total sample 568 
proportion is 16.0% 
conf level 0.99 
proportion not 84.0% 
critical value 2.576 
margin of 
error 0.039643726 
lower limit 12.1% 







Comparison of Tech-maker and Performance Entrepreneurship 
 
 
  Tech-maker 
Performance 
Entrepreneurship 
  91 469 
  568 568 
  16.0% 82.6% 
     
alpha 0.01  
p bar 0.492957746  
q bar 0.507042254  
z 22.43239845  














  469 13 
  568 568 
  82.6% 2.3% 
     
alpha 0.01   
p bar 0.424295775   
q bar 0.575704225   
z 27.37421129   












& Tech-enabled Tech-maker 
  240 91 
  568 568 
  42.3% 16.0% 
     
alpha 0.01   
p bar 0.291373239   
q bar 0.708626761   
z 9.728894569   
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